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Combating Fake News with 
“Reasonable Standards” 
 




Fake news is an intractable concern around the globe, sowing division 
and distrust in institutions, and undermining election integrity.  This Article 
analyzes the spectrum of private and public regulation of “fake news” from 
comparative law and normative perspectives.  In the United States, 
combating fake news shares surprising bipartisan support in an ever-divided 
political landscape.  While several proposals have emerged that would strip 
Internet media companies of the liability shield for third-party content, it is 
unlikely that they would survive the seemingly insurmountable First 
Amendment scrutiny.  This Article argues for a different tact—an amendment 
to the Communications Decency Act that addresses platform design choices 
rather than speech. In doing so, the Article addresses constitutional 
concerns of online expression and censorship and demonstrates that a 





In October 2019, Twitter, in addition to other tech platforms and media 
outlets like YouTube, Facebook, MSNBC, and Fox, ran a 30-second 
campaign ad that falsely accused Democratic presidential candidate Joe 
Biden of blackmailing Ukrainian officials to stop an investigation of his son.1  
The viral video was viewed more than 1.5 million times after President 
Trump posted it to his Twitter account.2  With top performing fake stories 
like this one reaching users, on average six times faster than content from 
 
* J.D., The George Washington University Law School, May 2020. Editor-in-Chief, 
Vol. 72, Federal Communications Law Journal, Internet Law & Policy Foundry Fellow. 
 1.  Emily Stewart, Facebook is refusing to take down a Trump ad making false claims about 
Joe Biden, VOX (OCT. 9, 2019, 2:30 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 
2019/10/9/20906612/trump-campaign-ad-joe-biden-ukraine-facebook.  
 2.  Eugene Kiely & Robert Farley, Fact: Trump TV Ad Misleads on Biden and Ukraine, 
FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/10/fact-trump-tv-ad-misleads-
on-biden-and-ukraine/.  
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reputable news outlets,3 Internet media companies are powerful vectors for 
the distribution and amplification of fake news.4 
“Fake news” articles have existed for centuries.  However, the Internet 
has enabled them to spread at a rapid pace, with users consuming, 
processing, and sharing them before anyone has considered their veracity.  
This phenomenon is particularly pernicious with respect to political 
information.  A 2017 Yale Law School Information Society Project 
identified that the primary tangible harm that results from fake news is that 
it “devalues and delegitimizes voices of expertise, authoritative institutions, 
and the concept of objective data—all of which undermines society’s ability 
to engage in rational discourse based upon shared facts.”5  Consider one 
estimate that suggests that “86% of the groups running paid ads on Facebook 
in the last six weeks before the 2016 election were suspicious groups, 
astroturf movement groups,6 and questionable news outlets.”7 
To understand the scale of the problem, consider that a 2019 World 
Economic Forum Global Risks report continued to call attention to “fake 
 
 3.  See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2019: 14TH EDITION (2019), http://www3. 
weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf. 
 4.  Merriam-Webster defines misinformation as “incorrect or misleading information,” 
whereas disinformation is distinguished as false information deliberately and often covertly spread 
(as by the planting of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.”  Compare 
misinformation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/misinformation (last visited Apr. 29, 2020), with disinformation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disinformation (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2020).  Colloquially, misinformation is understood as merely misleading whereas 
disinformation is understood as an outright falsehood.  As a result, the Article, as do the sources 
cited, uses the terms interchangeably.  Where possible, the article refers simply to “fake news.” 
It is important to note that “fake news” falls on a spectrum, measured by intent to deceive. The 
spectrum ranges from satire or parody misleading content on one end of the spectrum, to imposter 
and fabricated content in the mid-range, followed by false connection, where the imagery, captions, 
or headlines do not support the content, and false context and manipulated content.  See Claire 
Wardle, Fake News. It’s Complicated, FIRST DRAFT NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://medium.com/ 
1st- draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79. 
 5.  THE INFO. SOC’Y PROJECT & THE FLOYD ABRAMS INST. FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 
FIGHTING FAKE NEWS WORKSHOP REPORT, (Mar. 7, 2017), available at https://law.yale.edu/ 
sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/fighting_fake_news_-_workshop_report.pdf.  
 6.  Merriam-Webster defines astroturfing as “organized activity that is intended to create a 
false impression of a widespread, spontaneously arising, grassroots movement in support of or in 
opposition to something (such as a political policy) but that is in reality initiated and controlled by 
a concealed group or organization (such as a corporation).” Astroturfing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/astroturfing (last visited Apr. 
29, 2020).  
 7.  Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating Fake News and Other 
Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1230 (2018), https://southerncalifornialawreview. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/91_6_1223.pdf.  Existing campaign finance laws target paid 
advertising, which does not reflect the totality of fake news in the Internet media ecosystem.  
However, as the authors note, there is spending that occurs in various stages of a disinformation 
campaign, including salary and production that may trigger existing rules. 
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news” as a leading global risk.8  This risk assessment reflects a deeper 
concern that the prevalence of “fake news” has increased political 
polarization, decreased trust in public institutions, and undermined 
democracy.9  These phenomena complicate the means by which our political 
system operates and the manner in which people hold political leaders 
accountable.  In an Internet media ecosystem, which exposed Americans to 
more “fake news” than accurate political information during the 2016 U.S. 
election cycle,10 the economics of generating clicks and views of sensational 
or novel headlines over those that are newsworthy underscores the threat to 
democracy in failing to moderate fake news.11 
In fact, Internet media companies’ rational self interest lies in exploiting 
this phenomenon, increasing advertising revenue by promoting content that 
drives users to like, click, and share.12  For instance, during the 2016 election, 
fake news websites created by profit driven Macedonian teenagers indicated 
that the linchpin of their business model was to drive content to social media 
platforms.13  While likely not the sole motive for trafficking in “fake news,” 
the profit margin should not be understated.  As a case in point, a New York 
Times exclusive story about Donald Trump’s purported $916 million loss on 
his 1995 income tax returns generated a paltry 175,000 Facebook 
interactions over a month compared to a “fake news” headline from 
ConservativeState.com, which garnered 480,000 interactions in just one 
week.14  But how does the government address the issue of fake news in a 
manner that does not circumscribe protected speech? 
This Article seeks to analyze the spectrum of private and public 
regulation of disinformation in online political speech, hereinafter referred 
to as “fake news,” from comparative law and normative perspectives.  This 
Article then proposes an amendment to Section 230 of the Communications 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See Darrell M. West, How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation, BROOKINGS (Dec. 
18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/.  
 10.  See e.g., Philip Howard & Bence Kolanyi, Social Media Companies Must Respond to the 
Sinister Reality Behind Fake News, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2017, 7:03 PM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/30/social-media-companies-fake-news-us-election (discussing 
the unequal distribution of fake news across the country during the 2016 election).  
 11.  See generally Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation And 
Disinformation Online, DATA & SOC’Y, https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Data 
AndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf.  
 12.  Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As 
It Is (And As It Should Be) MICH. L. REV. 1073, (2020), https://repository.law.umich.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5820&context=mlr. 
 13.  Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens In the Balkans Are Duping Trump 
Supporters With Fake News, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM EST), https://www. 
buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump-misinfo?utm_ 
term=.eaD8L1pQO#.se1x-j35mJ.  
 14.  Id. 
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Decency Act requiring platforms to adopt “reasonable standards” in order to 
retain their shield of immunity. 
In addressing this issue, Part I will consider the impact of the spread of 
fake news on the Internet versus fake news consumption of political 
information via traditional media.  Moreover, Part I will review the self-
regulatory scheme and its role in the dissemination and amplification of fake 
news in online political speech.  As Part I will illustrate, the tension between 
industry self-interest and the public interest have necessitated a 
reexamination of the existing legal framework. 
Part II will then provide a comparative overview of the public 
regulation of online political speech in the European Union and address 
concerns of censorship and limiting freedom of expression.  While many of 
the legal strategies deployed in the E.U. would be incompatible with the First 
Amendment, this section will argue that the Internet media companies’ 
response to these initiatives demonstrate (1) a technological capacity to 
address “fake speech” in more direct ways than currently exist for the U.S. 
versions of their platforms; (2) an ability to engage third-party organizations 
in making determinations about what constitutes “fake news;” and (3) the 
need for regulation to modify platform behavior to align it in the public 
interest. 
Part III will discuss recent attempts to address the regulation of fake 
news in online political speech.  In particular, this part will consider proposed 
federal legislation, subsequently enacted state legislation, and resulting the 
judicial determinations about the constitutionality of attempts to regulate 
political speech. 
Finally, Part IV offers a recommendation to apply a legislative 
framework tailored for the Internet ecosystem that would provide guard rails 
against political “fake news” while respecting constitutional limitations on 
regulating speech.  Specifically, the Article proposes an amendment to 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, by carving out 
“reasonable standards” safe harbors under which Internet media companies 
may maintain the statutory immunity they enjoy for content posted by third 
parties. 
 
Current State of Online Political Speech in the U.S. 
 
Self-Interest and Self-Regulation Come to a  
Head in the Face of “Fake News” 
 
What is fake news?  NPR political reporter, Danielle Kurtzleben, notes 
that while contemporary political figures have co-opted the term “fake news” 
to devalue unfavorable news, fake news has traditionally referred to “lies 
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posing as news.”15  Fake news, in the traditional sense, is “a media product 
fabricated and disguised to look like credible news that is posted online and 
circulated via social media.”16  Either of these “strategic uses of “fake 
news”—to achieve specific political results and to destabilize the press as an 
institution—are self-evidently very dangerous for democracy.”17 
Traditional media arguably “expose[s] people to a range of topics and 
views at the same time that they provide shared experiences for a 
heterogeneous public.”18  Conversely, Internet media companies provide 
platforms that leverage technology to “infiltrate a population of unaware 
humans and manipulate them to affect their perception of reality, with 
unpredictable results.”19  “[F]actual knowledge about politics is a critical 
component of citizenship, one that is essential if citizens are to discern their 
real interests. . . . In the absence of adequate information neither passion nor 
reason is likely to lead to decisions that reflect the real interests of the 
public.”20  The erosion of public trust in traditional news sources creates a 
vacuum filled by misinformation.  Regulating “fake news” in online political 
speech in the context of an election is critical to protecting the rationality of 
electoral outcomes. 
As researchers Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis note, the spread of 
misinformation leads to decreased trust in media, the impact of which 
“weakens the political knowledge of citizens, inhibits its watchdog function, 
and may impede the full exercise of democracy.”21  This phenomenon is 
exacerbated by social and political divisions that undermine the traditional 
ways in which truth ordinarily prevails. “Investigations, exposés, and studies 
fall short in a situation where a significant portion of the population distrusts 
a wide array of sources they perceive as politically or ideologically hostile 
 
 15.  See Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake News,’ Trump Moves from Alternative Facts to 
Alternative Language, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 17, 2017) (discussing the partisan polarization in 
political discourse with the emergence of two separate views of fake news, first used to describe 
the intentional dissemination of fictional news, and later morphing, ironically, into disinformation, 
being adopted to discredit accurate but unfavorable news), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17 
/515630467/with-fake-news-trump-moves-from-altemative-facts-to-alternative-language.  
 16.  Nina I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation and 
Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 521-22 (2018), https://heinonline.org/ 
HOL/P?h=hein.journals/syrlr68&i=557.  Notably, this definition excludes unintentional reporting 
mistakes, conspiracy theories, satire that is unlikely to be misconstrued as factual, false statements 
by politicians, and reports that are slanted but not outright false. 
 17.  Lili Levi, Real Fake News and Fake Fake News, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 234-35 
(2018), https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1580&context=fac_articles. 
 18.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
43 (2018). 
 19.  West, supra note 9. 
 20.  MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 3, 5 (1996).  
 21.  Marwick, supra note 11 at 45. 
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The First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act stand as 
bulwarks to regulating online political speech.  The First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of 
speech; or the press.”23  Moreover, “the First Amendment has its fullest and 
most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political 
office.”24  The online dissemination of political opinions and information are 
incontrovertibly political speech and is therefore protected by the First 
Amendment.  Under the strong protections afforded to political speech, 
several legislative attempts to regulate in this space have been defeated.25  
For example, in Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2019), 
the court found 
 
The lodestar for the First Amendment is the preservation of the 
marketplace of ideas.  When the government seeks to favor or 
disfavor [political speech] . . . it compromises the integrity of our 
national discourse and risks bringing about a form of soft 
censorship. For this reason, content-based laws are “presumptively 
unconstitutional,” the presumption being necessary to ensure that 
the marketplace of ideas does not deteriorate into a forum for the 
subjects of state-favored speech. . . . Because our democracy relies 
on free debate as the vehicle of dispute and the engine of electoral 
change, political speech occupies a distinctive place in First 
Amendment law.26 
 
Regulation of political speech “trenches upon an area in which the 
importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.”27  Buttressing 
such strong protections of political speech—and hampering regulation on 
 
 22.  Suzanne Nossel, The Pro-Free Speech Way to Fight Fake News, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 
12, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12/the-pro-free-speech-way-to-fight-fake-
news/. 
 23.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 24.  Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Eu v. S.F. City. 
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, (1989)) (internal quotation omitted). 
 25.  See id. at 510 (invalidating Maryland’s SB875, Online Electioneering Transparency and 
Accountability Act). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 514 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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“fake news”—the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, extended full free 
speech protection to a knowing and intentional falsehood.28 
While content-based laws—those that “target speech based on its 
communicative content . . . may be justified only if the government proves 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests,”29 the 
Court has recognized a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the 
electoral process; however, it has stopped short of extending that to 
preventing fraud on the electorate.30  Absent reliable data demonstrating that 
false speech has significantly undermined the electoral process, however, it 
is unlikely that a court would find that this prong had been satisfied.  
Notwithstanding the difficulty in demonstrating significant harm, it is 
dubious that compelling Internet media companies to curb fake news is the 




The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), referred to in the industry 
simply as Section 230, was borne from concerns of defamation and 
indecency liability to address “the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to 
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”31  Touted 
as “the law that gave us modern Internet,”32  Section 230 provides statutory 
immunity to online platforms from treatment as a publisher or speaker.  The 
argument for this shield was a recognition that if Internet media companies 
could be liable for all user-generated content that they moderated, they 
wouldn’t moderate anything at all.33 
 
 28.  U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721-22 (2012) (“This opinion . . . . rejects the notion that 
false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected.”).  In Alvarez, the 
false speech at issue was Alvarez’s misrepresentation that he had won the Congressional Medal of 
Honor. 
 29.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 395 (1992)). 
 30.  Compare Eu v. S.F. City. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989) (“A State 
indisputably has compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”), with 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995) (“Ohio’s informational interest is 
plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement.”). 
 31.  129 F.3d 327, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  While the indecency prong was held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the defamation prong has become a lynchpin of the Internet 
ecosystem. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down indecency prong). 
 32.  Derek Khanna, The Law that Gave Us the Modern Internet –and the Campaign to Kill It, 
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-law-
that-gave-us-the-modern-internet-and-the-campaign-to-kill-it/279588/.  
 33.  Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230—and the Internet as We Know It, WIRED (Aug. 
13, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/.  
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Following judicial decisions holding online providers liable for user 
content.34  In Zeran v. America Online, the court opined that the specter of 
strict liability normally applied to publishers might chill the free flow of 
information.35  In response, it offered protection for “good Samaritan” 
blocking and screening of offensive material to encourage service providers 
to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services.36  
As Senator Ron Wyden, a drafter of the CDA, notes, this ensured “that 
companies in return for that protection—that they wouldn’t be sued 
indiscriminately—were being responsible in terms of policing their 
platforms.”37 
Specifically, Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”38  An 
interactive service provider is defined as “any information service, system, 
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server.”39  This shield extends to Internet media 
companies the relief that their offline counterparts—bookstores, newsstands, 
libraries, and other “distributors”—receive under common law.40 
However, broad judicial interpretation of Section 230 has provided 
immunity for conduct far beyond, and likely in direct conflict with, that 
which was contemplated by the CDA’s drafters who wanted to incentivize 
platforms to clean up the Internet.41  As Professor Tushnet opines, “[o]ne 
way to explain §230 is that it was enacted in the hope that ISPs would shut 
down speech that Congress couldn’t constitutionally ban. From this 
perspective, § 230 largely backfired.”42  Section 230 has offered platforms 
 
 34.  See e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup .Ct. 
May 24, 1995) (holding that the defendant’s message board was akin to a newspaper, and as such, 
by taking steps to police the content of this message board, the defendant engaged in an editorial 
function that exposed it to publisher liability). 
 35.  Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 at 330 (“the amount of information communicated via interactive 
computer services is . . . staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech 
would have an obviously chilling effect.”). 
 36.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018). 
 37.   Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google Is About to 
Change, NPR (Mar. 21, 2018) (quoting Wyden), http://www.wbur.org/npr/591622450/section-
230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change. 
 38.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
 39.  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018). 
 40.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). Immunity extended to interactive service providers is far 
from unconditional.  The statute provides for exceptions for criminal activity, IP infringement, and 
privacy, among others.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2018). 
 41.  Selukh, supra note 37.  
 42.  Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First 
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1008 n. 96 (2008), https://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/08/76-4-Tushnet.pdf. 
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“power without responsibility,”43 shielding sites that host revenge porn,44 
child predation,45  housing discrimination,46 and online sex trafficking.47 
 
Internet Media Companies are the Appropriate Vehicles for Regulation 
 
As a result of these two forces, Internet media companies rely on self-
regulatory exercises to address “fake news” with respect to political speech.  
Notwithstanding a shield of immunity against liability for third-party 
content, Internet media companies engage in a great deal of  moderation—
shadow banning, blocking, filtering—when it proves bad for business.48  The 
lack of government regulation in this space has resulted in a patchwork of 
content moderation practices that has garnered the attention—and 
frustration—of federal legislators.49 
Coordinated regulation is the appropriate response to the evolving 
media landscape wherein exists a conflict of self-interest, and where political 
vulnerability renders the current self-regulatory approach inapt.50  
Cooperation between public and private entities is a necessary part of 21st 
century Internet regulation.  Internet media companies are best positioned to 
mitigate harm because of their expertise on the issues that arise on their 
platforms and the technical requirements necessary to address them, whereas 
government regulation is required to provide accountability and an 
enforcement mechanism.51 Government coordination provides several 
important functions, including coordination facilitation, signaling to actors, 
behavior modification, and value setting.52 
 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  See e.g., Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 45.  See e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 600 
(2008); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), judgment summarily aff’d, 
551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 46.  See e.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 47.  See e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  Recognizing that 
judicial interpretation had stretched liability protection beyond its original intent, Congress cabined 
Section 230’s immunity with the passage of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA)/ Allow 
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) legislation.  The controversial 
amendment provided a carve out in immunity from federal civil and state criminal liability for 
services that “promote and facilitate prostitution.” 
 48.  See e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, 229 (2014) 
(discussing how Facebook changed its position on pro rape pages after fifteen companies threatened 
to pull their ads). 
 49.  Laslo, supra note 32; Casey Newton, Everything You Need to Know About Section 230, 
THE VERGE (Mar. 3, 2020, 9:20 AM EST), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/3/21144678/section-
230-explained-internet-speech-law-definition-guide-free-moderation.  
 50.  Wood, supra note 7. 
 51.  Wood, supra note 7. 
 52.  Id at 1244. 
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Technology companies, including Facebook, have signaled their 
support for modernizing the law to hold Internet media companies 
accountable for behavior on their platforms53 and more recently the 
platforms have been more amenable to a new regulatory framework.54 
 
The U.S. Regulatory Scheme: Industry Self-Regulation of  
“Fake News” in Online Political Speech 
 
Benefits of Self-Regulation 
 
According to proponents, “the benefits of industry self-regulation are 
apparent: speed, flexibility, sensitivity to market circumstances and lower 
costs.”55  Moreover, when standard setting is executed by industry insiders 
with deep subject-matter expertise, the resulting standards are arguably more 
practicable and more effectively policed.56  Proponents also maintain that 
industry accountability raises standards of behavior through a combination 
of peer pressure and an internalized sense of responsibility.  This elevated 
standard of behavior is perhaps evident in the Internet Media companies’ 
response to the global pandemic of COVID-19.57 
It is notable, however, that the Internet media ecosystem appears 
divorced from a typical industry self-regulation model wherein there is “an 
industry-level organization that regulates its members by setting rules and 
standards about how they should conduct their business.”58  Instead, 
individual companies have scrambled to provide the appropriate regulatory 
scaffolding—and stave off regulation. 
 
 53.  See Mark Zuckerberg, Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet needs new rules. Let’s start in 
these four areas, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019, 3:00 p.m. EDT), (“I believe we need a more active 
role for governments and regulators. By updating the rules for the Internet, we can preserve what’s 
best about it—the freedom for people to express themselves and for entrepreneurs to build new 
things—while also protecting society from broader harms.”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/ 
9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.htm. 
 54.  Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg released a white paper detailing potential regulation 
and its impact on platform content moderation.  See Monika Bickert. Charting A Way Forward: 
Online Content Regulation, FACEBOOK (Mar. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2020/02/Charting-A-Way-Forward_Online-Content-Regulation-White-Paper-1.pdf.  
 55.  Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 
19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997). 
 56.  See id. 
 57.  Internet media companies quickly developed strategies to provide their users with 
authoritative information on the virus, employed tools to combat misinformation, and provided data 
for research.  See e.g., Jonathan Shieber, Zuckerberg details the ways Facebook and Chan 
Zuckerberg Initiative are responding to COVID-19, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 3, 2020, 8:20 PM PST), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/03/zuckerberg-details-the-ways-facebook-and-chan-zuckerberg-
initiative-are-responding-to-covid-19/.  
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The Dark Side of Self-Regulation 
 
In practice, self-regulation often faces backlash for its perceived self-
interested behavior.  Cynics decry self-regulation as a façade by which 
industry “give[s] the appearance of regulation thereby warding off more 
direct and effective government intervention while serving private interests 
at the expense of the public.”59 
Critics admonish that self-regulatory standards are usually lax and 
enforcement is ineffective.60  Detractors also note that absent from self-
regulation are many of the virtues of conventional public regulation, namely, 
“visibility, credibility, accountability, compulsory application to all[,] . . . 
greater likelihood of rigorous standards being developed, cost spreading, . . . 
and availability of a range of sanctions.”61 
Left to their own devices, concern has arisen that content moderation 
strategies adopted by Internet media companies may not comport with 
customary First Amendment norms and doctrine.  As legal scholars 
highlight, Internet media companies “lack a coherent theory of the First 
Amendment.”62  Platforms are not “merely venues for debates in the 
marketplace of ideas,” neither are they “exclusively supportive of speakers’ 
personal autonomy,” nor have they “taken a [] deliberation-enhancing 
approach to speech . . . [that] should promote political engagement and 
public discourse.”63  Instead, the largest players in the Internet media 
landscape have camped out in their respective corners, leaving the field an 
“inconsistent amalgam” of these values.64 
Writ large, there is reason to be concerned with putting speech 
regulation wholly in the hands of private corporations.  As Verge tech 
reporter Casey Newton points out, “[i]f you don’t want the state making calls 
on political speech, you probably don’t want a quasi-state with 2.1 billion 
daily users making calls on political speech, either.”65 
 
U.S. Social Media Self-Regulation—Case Study: Drunk Nancy Pelosi 
 
A recent fake news story circulating in U.S. news aptly illustrates the 
dissemination and amplification of fake news at a scale impossible via 
 
 59.  Gunningham, supra note 55 at 369-70. 
 60.  See id. at 370.  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Wood, supra note 7. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Casey Newton, Why Facebook can’t stop politicians from lying, THE VERGE (Oct. 9, 
2019 6:00 AM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/10/9/20904516/facebook-politi 
cal-ad-lies-regulation.  
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traditional media.  The online sphere is the critical factor because of the 
speed, anonymity, and volume of content it allows.  On Wednesday, May 
23, 2019, an altered video that made it appear that House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi was drunk began to circulate broadly across social media platforms.66  
On Thursday evening, following a Fox Business news segment in which 
panelists speculated about the House Speaker’s health and fitness for office, 
President Donald Trump himself tweeted and then pinned to his profile 
another manipulated video of the House Speaker to his estimated 60 million 
Twitter followers.67  The altered video with the caption, “PELOSI 
STAMMERS THROUGH NEWS CONFERENCE” was slowed down to 
make her voice sound sluggish and her words appear slurred.68  The 
combination of the two videos and speculation about the Speaker’s health 
quickly gained attention.  National media outlets immediately published 
critical responses about the particular brand of misinformation at play, a 
“shallow fake,” and called for Internet media companies to take action.69 
The incident illustrates not only the role that online media companies 
can play in amplifying “fake news” but the way in which such “fake news” 
can make its way into mainstream news discourse.  Internet media companies 
engage in varying degrees of regulating online political speech through their 
community standards and terms of service.  Google’s YouTube took swift 
action to remove the video.70  However, Facebook’s community standards 
do not require that information posted on the platform is true.71  Instead, its 
policy at the time that the video was posted was to refer it to third-party fact 
checkers for review.72  The third-party fact checkers rated the video as false, 
and in accordance with the social media platform’s policy, downgraded the 
video’s distribution and provided additional context where it appeared in 
 
 66.  Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread Across 
Social Media, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019, 4:41 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-social-
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 67.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonald Trump), TWITTER (May 23, 2019, 6:09 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1131728912835383300; see also Emily Stewart, What’s Up 
With Twitter’s Follower Counts, Explained for Everyone — Including Trump, VOX (Apr. 24, 2019, 
5:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/24/18514772/twitter-trump-followers-meeting-jack-
dorsey.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  “Shallow fake” is a term used to describe the traditional-alteration and selective editing 
of video and imagery.  See Kalev Leetaru, The Real Danger Today is Shallow Fakes and Selective 
Editing Not Deep Fakes, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2019, 1:11 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kalevleetaru/2019/08/26/the-real-danger-today-is-shallow-fakes-and-selective-editing-not-deep-
fakes/#607cae1f4ea0. 
 70.  Donnie O’Sullivan, Doctored Videos Shared to Make Pelosi Sound Drunk Viewed 
Millions of Times On Social Media, CNN (May 24 2019, 12:31 PM), https://www.cnn. 
com/2019/05/23/politics/doctored-video-pelosi/index.html.  
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 72.  Id. 
  
2021 COMBATING FAKE NEWS  93 
users’ news feeds.73  Nonetheless, one version of the video had 2.5 million 
views on its platform in just 12 hours after the video was posted.74 
 
Internet Media Companies’ Varied Approaches to Self-Regulation in the 
U.S. 
 
On one end of the spectrum, Twitter announced an outright ban on 
political advertising on its platform.75  Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey recognizes 
the shift that the Internet presents in the ways that political information is 
consumed.  Dorsey explained in a tweet that “Internet political ads present 
entirely new challenges to civic discourse—machine-learning-based 
optimization of messaging and microtargeting, unchecked misleading 
information and deep fakes, all at increasing velocity, sophistication and 
overwhelming scale.”76  Though the move was largely viewed as symbolic,77 
it sets the social media platform apart in the Internet media ecosystem.  With 
digital advertising costing a fraction of traditional television advertising, 
observers decry the move as disadvantaging challengers while supporting 
entrenched candidates.78  In May 2020, Twitter took further action and began 
applying a new label to tweets that contain potentially misleading 
information about voting processes.79  For example, a new label prompting 
Twitter users to “Get the facts about mail-in ballots” accompanied a set of 
tweets in which the president railed against mail-in voting methods as 
“fraudulent”80 
Following Twitter’s announcement of its ban on political 
advertisements, Google, announced an update to its political advertising 
policy, with the goals to “protect campaigns, surface authoritative election 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Kate Conger, Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack Dorsey Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/twitter-political-ads-ban.html.   
 76.  Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
jack/status/1189634369016586240.  
 77.  It should be noted that Twitter’s political advertising comprised a small fraction of its 
advertising business.  Moreover, the free exposure that the platform provides politicians more than 
accounts for any loss in advertising opportunity.  For example, according to The Guardian’s 
Shannon McGregor, 80% of President Trump’s tweets make their way into mainstream media, 
garnering media exposure.  That exposure was valued at an estimated $2bn during the 2016 election 
cycle.  See generally Shannon C. McGregor, Why Twitter’s Ban on Political Ads Isn’t As Good As 
it Sounds, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2019, 6:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/comment 
isfree/2019/nov/04/twitters-political-ads-ban.  
 78.  McGregor, supra, note 76. 
 79.  See Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information, 
TWITTER: BLOG (May 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-
approach-to-misleading-information.html.  
 80.  Makena Kelly, Twitter Labels Trump Tweets As ‘Potentially Misleading’ for the First 
Time, THE VERGE (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:04 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2020/ 
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news, and protect elections from foreign interference.”81  Attempting to align 
itself with traditional media outlets, such as TV, radio, and print, Google has 
prohibited political campaigns from engaging in microtargeting, an 
advertising technique that uses consumer data, online behavior, and 
demographics to tailor messaging.82  Microtargeting has been viewed as “the 
online equivalent of whispering millions of different messages into zillions 
of different ears for maximum effect and with minimum scrutiny.”83  In 
particular, political campaigns are no longer permitted to target “affinity 
audiences” or “remarket,”—serve ads to people who’ve previously taken an 
action, for instance visiting a campaign’s website.84  Striking at the heart of 
the problem of fake news, advertisements with “demonstrably false claims 
that could significantly undermine participation or trust” in elections are now 
banned.85 
On the other end of the spectrum, Facebook has made the controversial 
decision to continue to allow political “fake news” to propagate across its 
platform.  Instead, Facebook’s policy is merely to provide additional context, 
by way of “related news” links appearing next to “fake news.”  By late July 
2020 pressure on Internet media companies to label potentially misleading 
information led Facebook to adopt what critics decry as a half-measure.  The 
platform implemented a new policy to add a link to official voting 
information to any post about voting, whether the post is John Q. Citizen or 
a political candidate and regardless of whether the content is accurate.86  
Facebook’s stance on not fact checking advertisements from politicians can 
be explained, at least in part, by what Professor Philip Napoli identifies as “a 
First Amendment tradition that has valorized the notion of 
counter[]speech.”87 
Facebook’s community standards prohibit “misinformation” defined as 
“ads that include claims debunked by third-party fact checkers or, in certain 
circumstances, claims debunked by organizations with particular 
 
 81.  Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Nov. 
20, 2019), https://www.blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-policy/. 
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Plans for 2020 Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
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Times (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/opinion/google-political-ads.html.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Spencer, supra, note 81. 
 86.  Shirin Ghaffary, Facebook’s New Label on a Trump Post Is an “Abject Failure,” Says a 
Biden Campaign Spokesperson, VOX (July 21, 2020, 7:12 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/ 
recode/2020/7/21/21333001/facebook-label-trump-fact-check-biden-democrats-republicans-2020 
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Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 58 (2018) (internal 
quotations omitted); see e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727 (“The remedy for speech that is false is 
speech that is true.”). 
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expertise.”88  While paid political advertising must conform to the platform’s 
community standards, Facebook VP of Global Affairs and Communications, 
Nick Clegg, clarified that most political advertisements would be exempt 
from the platform’s fact-checking.89  The platform has not addressed the hot-
button issue of microtargeting.  Political strategists highlight Facebook’s 
desire to walk the fine line between moderating content and alienating 
groups who leverage the platform’s access to an estimated 70% of American 
adults90 in their campaign fundraising efforts. 
Facebook’s practices allow it to adopt an approach that, on the one 
hand, espouses transparency whereby political advertisements are available 
to the public so that researchers, journalists, and John Q. Citizen can 
investigate the content of those ads themselves, while on the other hand 
continuing to advance a business model predicated on generating advertising 
revenue by exerting near-total control of users’ online experience.91 
Legislators have cautioned that Internet media companies are abusing 
the immunity extended to them by the Communications Decency Act.92  
Some have indicated that removal of such immunity is not out of the 
question, and were Congress to act, it would end the self-regulation regime 
in the U.S., moving things more in line with the E.U. model.93 
 
Current State of Online Political Speech in the E.U. 
 
The Action Plan against Disinformation 
 
The model for combating fake news in the European Union stands in 
direct contrast to the self-regulatory framework of the U.S.  Europe has 
traditionally favored regulation over freedom of expression.  Identifying fake 
news as a “threat to democratic political and policy-making processes,” the 
European Union has a adopted a public governance approach combating it.  
While incompatible with the First Amendment, a comparative overview of 
 
 88. Advertising Policies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads (last visited 
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public regulation of online political speech in the European Union highlights 
three phenomena:  (1) a technological capacity to address “fake speech” in 
more direct ways, (2) a workable framework for engaging third-party 
organizations so as to avoid being “arbiters of truth,” and (3) the need for 
regulation to modify platform behavior for the public good. 
Since 2015, following a decision of the European Counsel in response 
to Russian disinformation campaigns, the E.U. has been actively regulating 
disinformation,94 defined as “verifiably false or misleading information 
created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally 
deceive the public.”95  In 2018, the European Commission took additional 
steps to crack down on “fake news,” adopting The Action Plan against 
Disinformation (“The Plan”).96  The first prong of The Plan focuses on 
improving detection of disinformation, through investment in additional 
staff, data analysis tools, and public education efforts.97  In the second prong 
of the plan, the E.U. implemented a coordinated alert system among E.U. 
institutions and member states to respond to disinformation threats in real 
time.98  With respect to U.S. efforts, the third prong of the approach is 
noteworthy.  The third prong of the approach included the adoption of a self-
regulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation as a component of its Action 
Plan against Disinformation.  Among seven European trade associations, 
U.S. signatories to the Code of Practice include Internet media companies 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and Twitter.99  The Code of Practice 
seeks to ensure transparency in political advertising, the shuttering of fake 
accounts, identifying non-human interactions, and cooperating with fact-
checkers to detect disinformation and widely promote fact-checked 
content.100  Each signatory presented detailed roadmaps highlighting the 
tools to be deployed against fake news.101 
 
E.U. Public Regulation of Fake News in Online Political Speech 
 
Transparency, accountability, and consumer protection are often touted 
benefits of public regulation.  Detractors argue that federal regulation may 
 
 94.  Press Release IP/18/6647, European Commission , A Europe that Protects: The EU Steps 
Up Action Against Disinformation (Dec. 5, 2018).  
 95. European Commission, Policy on Tackling Online Disinformation, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
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 97.  Id. 
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be excessively burdensome.  Researchers point to three phenomena that 
undermine the utility of public regulation. “First, agencies intermittently 
overreact to crises, and years, if not decades, may pass before guidelines 
developed in the aftermath of crises are corrected. Second, government 
agencies are not liable for inefficient rules, undermining the financial 
accountability necessary to incentivize efficient rulemaking and thereby 
potentially promoting over-regulation.”102  The pace of industry transition 
exacerbates the shortcomings of general agency regulation with rapid 
technological evolution outpacing government regulation.  This is evident in 
the conversation on the Hill with respect to modernizing the twenty-four year 
old Communications Decency Act that was penned almost a decade before 
Facebook, was founded. 
Other detractors condemn government regulation as exceedingly 
flexible and under-enforced for a myriad of reasons: lack of resources, 
insular perspectives of government, self-serving administrators, or 
regulatory capture.103  Moreover, changes between administrations may lead 
to vacillation between standards. 104  The revolving door between political 
appointments and private sector executive suites may also foster a climate 
whereby administrators may seek to improve their prospects in industry by 
advancing the agenda of interest groups that desire loose policies.105 
 
E.U Social Media Public Regulation – Case Study: Maria and the Mafia 
 
In November 2017, in the weeks before Italy’s national election, 
photographs began to circulate that  purported to show Maria Elena Boschi, 
a prominent lawmaker and member of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s 
ruling Democratic Party, at a funeral mourning the recent death of the 
notorious mafia boss Salvatore “Toto” Riina.106  The doctored picture 
included the a caption: “Look who was there to say one last goodbye to Toto 
Riina?”107  The photo, shared by a Facebook account with a profile image 
which appeared to attribute the post to opposition political party, 5 Star 
Movement (Virus5Steelle) is real—taken at a 2016 funeral of a Nigerian 
refugee who was murdered.  The account was later determined to a fake.108 
Without a disinformation policy in place, the Italian government was 
dependent on Facebook to police the fake news.  “We ask the social 
 
 102.  Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 556–69 (2011). 
 103.  Id. at 568–69.  
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networks, and especially Facebook, to help us have a clean electoral 
campaign,” said Mr. Renzi.109  Boschi herself took to Facebook to decry the 
fake news with the hashtag #nofakenews.110  Following pleas of help from 
the Italian government, Facebook announced a fact-checking program 
similar to the U.S. program that relies on third-party fact checkers and user 
reporting aimed at identifying and debunking false information.  The 
program works with third-party fact-checking organizations to develop 
additional fact-checking reporting which is then posted prominently near the 
false story and subsequently demoted on the Facebook algorithm.111  Unlike 
the U.S. program, when a user attempts to share the fake news, a notification 
alerts them of the disputed content and refers them to additional 
information.112  The Italian government has dedicated resources to educate 
its citizenry on detecting fake news.113  This situation demonstrates the 
vulnerability of the political process to come under attack by unknown 
perpetrators and the facility with which Internet media companies can take 
reasonable steps to combat fake news. 
Italy’s antitrust chief enforcer, Giovanni Pitruzella argued that the 
distribution of fake news violates European citizen’s “right to be 
pluralistically informed.”114 Moreover, he urged the government to get 
involved in verifying information and the removal of “fake news” to avoid 
“group polarization.”115  As Justice Kennedy cautioned in United States v. 
Alvarez, the government serving as arbiter of what is fake is simply 
untenable in the United States as incompatible with the First Amendment.  
In his words, 
 
[p]ermitting the government to decree [false] speech to be a 
criminal offense . . . would endorse government authority to 
compile a list of subjects about which false statements are 
punishable. . . . Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea 
that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.116 
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Other European countries have taken definitive steps to legislate fake 
news.  In 2017, the German Bundestag passed the Network Enforcement Act, 
an “Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks” 
(“NetzDG”), a law that requires Internet media companies with greater than 
two million registered users to block and delete illegal content, while 
increasing transparency and accountability of platform content removals, 
subject to monetary fines up to €5 million for noncompliance.117  Notably, 
NetzDG mandates that platforms “remove[] or block[] access to content that 
is manifestly unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint.”118 
The law has come under fire, in relevant part with respect to “fake 
news,” because it provides that “the decision regarding the unlawfulness of 
the content is dependent on the falsity,” which is determined by the platforms 
themselves.119  Volker Tripp, political director of the non-profit internet 
rights organization Digitale Gesellschaft (“digital society”) noted that 
“unilaterally shifting this responsibility onto companies is legally 
questionable and on top of that not productive.”120  Though Facebook ran 
afoul of NetzDG for allegedly underreporting the complaints that the 
platform received,121 critics assert that the law incentivizes companies to 
“delete in doubt” because it compels decision-making within such a short 
time period.122 
 
Internet Media Companies’ Response to Public Regulation 
 
In response to the German law, each of the “Big Three” online media 
companies, Google, Facebook, and Twitter, took differing compliance 
approaches.  Google and Twitter developed an integrated NetzDG flagging 
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tool whereby users can directly report objectionable content.123  In contrast, 
Facebook has embedded its NetzDG complaint form in its Help Center.124  
Facebook’s dedicated team first reviews reported content for compliance 
with Facebook’s community standards.125  Content found in violation of the 
platform’s community standards are removed globally.  If the content is 
violative of NetzDG but does not run afoul of the community standards, the 
content is blocked in Germany and reported.  This two-step review process 
and the obscured location may be attributable to the relatively lower 
reporting rates discussed above.126 
Twitter has likewise assembled a compliance team of 50 staff 
specifically designed to address NetzDG complaints according to the 
NetzDG’s narrower definition of illegal content.127  Elsewhere, content is 
first reviewed according to Twitter’s terms and conditions.128  Google’s team 
removes most content for violating community guidelines, rather than 
NetzDG noting that the two “have a large degree of overlap.”129  While the 
platforms handle most takedowns internally, both Facebook and Google 
work in collaboration with a voluntary intermediary to review questionable 
content within the mandated 7-day timeframe.130 
 
Testing the Regulatory Boundaries of Online Political Speech  
in the U.S. 
 
Under the existing jurisprudential framework, the United States 
government appears relegated to taking no more than small steps to combat 
fake news.131  The United States government frequently requests that Internet 
media companies remove content or delete user accounts that the 
 
 123.  WILLIAM ECHIKSON & OLIVIA KNODT, GERMANY’S NETZDG: A KEY TEST FOR 
COMBATTING ONLINE HATE, 1, 7 (CEPS Policy Insight, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300636.  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 8. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 11. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 10. 
 130.  Id. at 12. 
 131.  First Amendment protections limit the government’s ability to regulate political speech; 
however, other federal national security and campaign finance laws compel transparency and 
disclosure.  See 52 U.S.C. §30121 (2012) (discussing contributions and donations by foreign 
nationals); 11 C.F.R. §110.20 (2017) (prohibiting contributions, donations, expenditures, 
independent expenditures, and disbursements by foreign nationals).  
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government finds problematic.132  Such requests go unanswered.133  A 
number of federal legislative proposals have been advanced to update the 
government’s toolbox in its battle against “fake news.” 
 
The Honest Ads Act 
 
Spurred in part by allegations of attempted election interference by 
Russian nationals, in October 2017, Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), 
Mark Warner (D-VA), and the late Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced 
the Honest Ads Act, which would extend existing campaign finance 
regulations for broadcast advertising to online platforms.134  The Honest Ads 
Act would subject Internet media companies to transparency and record-
keeping requirements.135  The bill stalled; however, it was reintroduced in 
May 2019, again with bipartisan co-sponsorship and bolstered by industry 
support.136 
 
The Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act 
 
States have also entered the battle to protect the integrity of the nation’s 
electoral process.  The Maryland law, SB 875, the Online Electioneering 
Transparency and Accountability Act, took effect in July 2018.  Drawing 
from language in the Honest Ads Act, the law extended Maryland’s existing 
campaign finance regulation law governing traditional media in two critical 
ways with an eye toward the Internet domain.  First, the new law added 
online advertisements to the record-keeping and disclosure requirements.  
Specifically, the record-keeping and disclosure provision required online 
platforms to disclose the identity of an ad purchaser, the individuals who 
exercise control over the purchaser, and the total amount paid for the ad.  
This information was required to be maintained for inspection for up to a 
year following an election.  Second, the state extended its reach to “online 
 
 132. See e.g., Transparency Report: United States of America, TWITTER, https://trans 
parency.twitter.com/en/countries/us.html  (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Transparency 
Report]. 
 133.  Id. (Of the 170 removal requests made on behalf of the U.S. government between January 
and June 2019, identifying 732 accounts, Twitter complied with zero requests). 
 134.  The rules, which also banned foreign nationals from paying for ads that mention political 
candidates leading up to elections, are outlined in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) 
of 2002, also known as McCain-Feingold, which laid out the requirements for “electioneering 
communications” in broadcast, cable, and satellite communications. Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
 135.  Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017).  The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) of 2002, also known as McCain-Feingold, which laid out the requirements for 
“electioneering communications” in broadcast, cable, and satellite communications, served as a 
blueprint for the bill.  The Honest Ads Act also banned foreign nationals from paying for ads that 
mention political candidates leading up to elections. 
 136.  Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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platforms,” defined as “any public facing website . . . including a social 
media network or search engine that has 100,000 or more . . . visitors.”137 
Publishers, including The Washington Post and The Baltimore Sun, 
challenged the new law on First Amendment grounds because the disclosure 
requirements compelled the publishers to engage in speech.  The Fourth 
Circuit sitting en banc affirmed a federal district court’s decision to enjoin 
enforcement of the record-keeping and disclosure requirements, raising 
several First Amendment grounds: (1) the Act is an impermissible content-
based regulation on speech; (2) “the Act concerns content that is ordinarily 
shielded within “the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,”138 and (3) 
the Act compels speech.  “In sum, it is apparent that Maryland’s law creates 
a constitutional infirmity distinct from garden-variety campaign finance 
regulations.”139 
Notwithstanding the bipartisan support that the Honest Ads Act 
garnered and the passage of the state legislation, both efforts are ill-suited to 
address “fake news” because their focus on paid advertising overlooks the 
volume of Internet-enabled “cheap speech.”140 The economic implications of 
potentially anyone disseminating speech “have undermined mediating and 
stabilizing institutions of American democracy including newspapers and 
political parties, with negative social and political consequences.”141 
 
Proposed Executive Order 
 
The assault on fake news in the United States reached a fever pitch on 
May 28, 2020, as President Trump released an Executive Order that takes 
aim at the intermediary liability protections that Section 230 extends to 
Internet media companies.142  The Executive Order appears to be a reboot of 
a 2017 draft that received renewed attention from the administration after 
two of the President’s tweets on mail-in voter fraud were flagged as 
misleading.143  Striking at the heart of Communications Decency Act, 
 
 137.  S. 875, 2018 Gen. Assemb., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) (Online Electioneering Transparency 
and Accountability Act).  
 138.  See McManus, 944 F.3d at 514. 
 139.  Id. at 517.  
 140.  Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807 
(1995). 
 141.  Symposium, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 200, 201 (2017).   
 142.  Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (May 28, 2020).   
 143.  The 2020 Executive Order follows a 2017 draft Executive Order which arose from 
concerns of political bias and is supported by a purported 15,000 anecdotal complaints of political 
censorship on social media platforms.  However, accusations of political bias remain unproven.  
See Shiva Stella, Public Knowledge Responds to White House Proposal to Require FTC, FCC to 
Monitor Speech on Social Media, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.public 
knowledge.org/press-release/public-knowledge-responds-to-white-house-proposal-to-require-ftc-
fcc-to-monitor-speech-on-social-media/; Casey Newton, Why Twitter Labeling Trump’s Tweets As 
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Section 230, the Executive Order calls for government review of Internet 
media companies’ content moderation practices, declaring that “[w]e must 
seek transparency and accountability from online platforms, and encourage 
standards and tools to protect and preserve the integrity and openness of 
American discourse and freedom of expression.”144 
The Executive Order, “Preventing Online Censorship,” addresses 
perceived bias by Internet media companies in moderating political 
speech.145  The White House seeks to curtail the good-faith provision of the 
Communications Decency Act by imposing additional obligations on 
Internet media companies seeking liability protections.146  Specifically, the 
Executive Order attempts to tie the “good faith” liability shield in Section 
230(c)(2), which immunizes platforms from liability arising from “any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene . . . or otherwise 
objectionable,” to the protections in Section 230(c)(1), which protects 
platforms from being treated as speakers.  The Executive Order invokes 
sweeping government action to regulate Internet media companies. Among 
other actions, the order directs the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration to file a petition for rulemaking with the Federal 
Communications Commission to “propose regulations to clarify” the  scope 
of Section 230, directs the Federal Trade Commission to report on 
complaints of political bias, instructs the Department of Justice to investigate 
allegations of anti-conservative bias, and prevents federal agencies from 
advertising on platforms that allegedly violate Section 230’s good faith 
principles.  Notwithstanding the jurisdictional and constitutional concerns 
that it raises, the Executive Order demonstrates a political openness to 
stipulate safe harbors for Internet media companies to retain liability 
protection.147 
 
Proposed Model: Coordinated Regulation through  
“Reasonable Standards” 
 
The growing political will in both the legislative and executive branches 
to revisit the regulation of Internet media companies represents a moment to 
exercise reasonableness in addressing the 26 words that created the Internet.  
 
“Potentially Misleading” Is a Big Step Forward, THE VERGE: THE INTERFACE (May 27, 2020, 
5:01 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/5/27/21270556/trump-twitter-label-mis 
leading-tweets. 
 144.  Executive Order, supra, note 142. 
 145.  See Brian Fung et al., Trump Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media Companies, 
CNN POLITICS (May 28, 2020, 9:22 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/trump-
twitter-social-media-executive-order/index.html. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
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A coordinated regulatory approach would capitalize on the strengths and 
virtues of industry self-regulation, while accounting for its weaknesses as a 
self-interested body. 
Professors Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes advance a proposition 
that conditions immunity not on a platform’s content moderation, but rather 
on the platform’s design choices.  This “precision regulation” approach 
would strip immunity for Internet media companies whose “design choices 
[ ]amounted to a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent or address 
unlawful uses of its services.”148  What is more, observers have noted that 
the harms resulting from “fake news” are less about what is shared, rather 
than how it is shared.149  After all, the Internet has revolutionized the speed 
and volume with which fake news is propagated.  What users see is 
determined entirely by the algorithms deployed by Internet media companies 
that rank and prioritize content.  “They design and predict nearly everything 
that happens on their site, from the moment a user signs in to the moment 
she logs out.”150 
The proposed amendment to Section 230(c)(1) reads, in relevant part, 
that 
 
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes 
reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its services 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider in any action 
arising out of the publication of content provided by that 
information content provider.151 
 
Under this conceptualization, adopting a reasonable standard of care 
replaces the broad immunity currently enjoyed with an affirmative defense 
against liability claims.  As Citron notes, the reasonable standard would 
examine whether the company employed reasonable content management 
practices writ-large, rather than with respect to a particular use of the service.  
As such, the reasonableness standard offers flexibility to evolve as the 
existent technology does. 
 
 148.  Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans Sec. 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 417 (2017).  Consider Former FCC 
Commissioner Tom Wheeler’s proposition that “public interest algorithms” can be among Internet 
media platform’s consumer protection toolkit.  See Tom Wheeler, “Using ‘Public Interest 
Algorithms’ to Tackle the Problems Created by Social Media Algorithms,” BROOKINGS: 
TECHTANK, (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/11/01/using-public-
interest-algorithms-to-tackle-the-problems-created-by-social-media-algorithms/.  
 149.  See e.g., The Information Society Project, supra note 5 at 5. 
 150.  Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT 
INSTITUTE (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data.  
 151.  Citron, supra, note 147 at 419. 
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Some have balked at reforming Section 230, warning that it would stifle 
innovation and end the Internet as we know it. 152  Critics are also wont to 
cite Congress’ desire to “encourage the unfettered and unregulated 
development of free speech on the Internet.”153  However, these arguments 
are tenuous when considered in light of another regulatory framework 
crafted precisely for the Internet age—the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”).154 
Internet media companies are already “quite good at complying with at 
least one government regulation.”155  The DMCA has, as intended, mobilized 
platforms to control individual users.  Remarkably, “[t]he existence of the 
legal scheme set forth in the DMCA demonstrates that the CDA’s policy of 
conferring complete immunity on ISPs is not inevitable and, most 
significantly, not currently understood as a First Amendment 
requirement.”156  In the estimation of communications professors Nina 
Brown and Jonathan Peters, “[i]f there were any existing, workable model 
for Congress to use to regulate fake news on social media, this would be 
it.”157 
Like Section 230, the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA shield online 
service providers from claims—in this instance copyright infringement 
claims—arising from third-parties.  Section 512 of the DMCA states that a 
service provider must adopt and reasonably implement a policy as a 
condition of eligibility for safe harbor protection.158 
Consider a recent lawsuit wherein an Internet media company invoked 
Section 230 in light of the proposed reasonable steps approach.  While the 
matter did not involve fake news, the analysis provides a basis for 
consideration.  Section 230 doctrine insulated Grindr, an online dating 
platform, in a lawsuit alleging that the platform’s negligent design of its 
dating app enabled a campaign of harassment resulting from a user’s ability 
to impersonate another.159  Specifically, the amended complaint alleged that 
the site, whose terms of service prohibit the use of its product to impersonate, 
 
 152.  See e.g., Andy Kessler, Kill Section 230, You Kill the Internet, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 
2019 3:56 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kill-section-230-you-kill-the-internet-11561 
924578.   
 153.  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 154.  Citron, supra note 12. 
 155.  BROWN, supra note 16, at 530 (discussing the notice and takedown provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)). 
 156.  Tushnet, supra note 41, at 1004.  Professor Citron has noted that the critique that 
Congress intended to encourage free speech on the Internet is divorced from the legislative history. 
See CDA 230: Legislative History, Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/ 
issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Apr. 29, 2020). 
 157.  Brown, supra note 16, at 531 note 72 (noting that DMCA § 512 has been used as a 
suggested framework for legislation in the instances of regulating revenge pornography and 
defamation). 
 158.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018). 
 159.  Herrick v. Grindr, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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stalk, harass, or threaten, did nothing to respond to the plaintiff’s 
complaints.160  Moreover, the complaint alleged a number of design 
decisions that, if reasonably undertaken, would have prevented or mitigated 
the harm.161  There, a court may be unlikely to grant a motion to dismiss on 
Section 230 grounds under the proposed amendment, reasoning that the site 
lacked a reasonable process to monitor its terms of service writ large rather 
than because the site moderators failed to respond responsibly in the 
Plaintiff’s case. 
With respect to moderating fake news, an Internet media company 
could avail itself of Section 230 safe harbors if it employed reasonable steps 
to monitor, identify, and remove content that did not accord with its 
community standards and terms of service.  An argument could be made that 
content moderation decisions including algorithm-enabled ranking may be 
similar to a publisher’s editorial choices and may deserve First Amendment 
protection.  Thus, the validity of this regulation would involve discerning 
whether the algorithms that the Internet media companies deploy are due 
First Amendment rights as a type of speech. 
Amending Section 230 will likely raise concerns about censorship.  
Those concerns, however, may be overblown in light of online media 
companies’ conduct in compliance with German regulation discussed above.  
Moreover, the amendment’s effect of compelling platforms to adopt 
reasonable standards in order to retain immunity would not come to bear on 
any particular element of speech. 
To the extent that the proposed amendment is resisted on the grounds 
that it contravenes the legislative intent to leave the Internet unregulated,  this 
Article offers the proposition that “[t]he Internet is no longer a fragile new 
means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by 
overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-
mortar businesses. Rather, it has become a dominant-perhaps the 
preeminent-means through which commerce is conducted.”162 
Lawrence Lessig reminds us that “[h]ow the code regulates . . . [is a] 
question[] that any practice of justice must focus [on] in the age of 
cyberspace.”163  Platforms control what content appears on their services 
through their design choices and speech policies.164  Thus, it is in this 
currently unregulated space that Congress is afforded perhaps the most 
 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 163.  Id.; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Note, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information 
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-56 (1998) (exploring how system 
design choices provide sources of rulemaking and make a “useful extra-legal instrument that may 
be used to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge conventional laws”). 
 164.  See Citron, supra note 12. 
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appropriate opportunity to affect behavioral change while maintaining the 




Fake news presents an ever-growing problem around the globe.  The 
First Amendment’s free speech protections and the Communications 
Decency Act curtail any government regulation on speech.  However, that 
does not leave the area without regulation.  The private sector needs 
regulatory support to bolster its efforts to find fake news and identify it for 
users.  This can be achieved through an amendment to Section 230 that 
conditions immunity on compliance with technical reasonable standards to 
address fake news.  The recommendation of the adoption of the “reasonable 
standards” approach advanced herein is a modest extension of current 
jurisprudence and would provide a balanced approach to regulating online 
political speech, so as to not curb free expression or censor content. 
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*** 
